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The New York Times - Oct 12, 2007
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/13/washington/13general.html

Ex-Commander Says Iraq Effort Is ‘a Nightmare’

By DAVID S. CLOUD

WASHINGTON, Oct. 12 — In a sweeping indictment of the four-year effort
in Iraq, the former top commander of American forces there called the
Bush administration’s handling of the war “incompetent” and said the
result was “a nightmare with no end in sight.”

Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, who retired in 2006 after being replaced
in Iraq after the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal, blamed the Bush
administration for a “catastrophically flawed, unrealistically
optimistic war plan” and denounced the current addition of American
forces as a “desperate” move that would not achieve long-term stability.

“After more than four years of fighting, America continues its
desperate struggle in Iraq without any concerted effort to devise a
strategy that will achieve victory in that war-torn country or in the
greater conflict against extremism,” General Sanchez said at a
gathering of military reporters and editors in Arlington, Va.

He is the most senior war commander of a string of retired officers who
have harshly criticized the administration’s conduct of the war. While
much of the previous condemnation has been focused on the role of
former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, General Sanchez’s was an
unusually broad attack on the overall course of the war.

But his own role as commander in Iraq during the Abu Ghraib scandal
leaves him vulnerable to criticism that he is shifting the blame from
himself to the administration that ultimately replaced him and declined
to nominate him for a fourth star, forcing his retirement.

Though he was cleared of wrongdoing in the abuses after an inquiry by
the Army’s inspector general, General Sanchez became a symbol — with
civilian officials like L. Paul Bremer III, the head of the Coalition
Provisional Authority — of ineffective American leadership early in the
occupation.

General Sanchez said he was convinced that the American effort in Iraq
was failing the day after he took command, in June 2003. Asked why he
waited until nearly a year after his retirement to voice his concerns
publicly, he responded that it was not the place of active-duty
officers to challenge lawful orders from the civilian authorities.

General Sanchez, who is said to be considering writing a book, promised
further public statements criticizing officials by name.

“There has been a glaring and unfortunate display of incompetent
strategic leadership within our national leaders,” he said, adding that
civilian officials have been “derelict in their duties” and guilty of a
“lust for power.”

White House officials would not comment directly on General Sanchez’s
remarks. “We appreciate his service to the country,” said Kate Starr, a
White House spokeswoman.

She noted that Gen. David H. Petraeus, the current top commander in
Iraq, and Ryan C. Crocker, the American ambassador to Baghdad, said in
their testimony to Congress last month that “there’s more work to be
done, but progress is being made in Iraq. And that’s what we’re focused
on now.”

General Sanchez has been criticized by some current and retired
officers for failing to recognize the growing insurgency in Iraq during
his year in command and for failing to put together a plan to unify the
disparate military effort, a task that was finally carried out when his
successor, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., took over in mid-2006.

General Sanchez included the military and himself among those who made
mistakes in Iraq, citing a failure by top commanders to insist on a
better post-invasion stabilization plan. He offered a tepid compliment
to General Petraeus. The general, he said, could use American troops to
gain time in Iraq but could not achieve lasting results.

Michael E. O’Hanlon, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution,
criticized General Sanchez for implying in his speech that the current
military strategy of relying on additional troops and on protecting the
Iraqi people is little different than the strategy employed when he was
in command.

Noting that calls by members of Congress for troops were rebuffed by
the Bush administration in 2003, Mr. O’Hanlon said, “Sanchez was one of
the top military people who condoned that, if not directly, then by his
silence.”

General Sanchez’s main criticism was leveled at the Bush
administration, which he said failed to mobilize the entire United
States government, not just the military, to contribute meaningfully to
reconstructing and stabilizing Iraq.

“National leadership continues to believe that victory can be achieved
by military power alone,” he said. “Continued manipulations and
adjustments to our military strategy will not achieve victory. The best
we can do with this flawed approach is stave off defeat.”

Asked after his remarks what strategy he favored, General Sanchez
ticked off a series of steps—from promoting reconciliation among Iraq’s
warring sectarian factions to building effective Iraqi army and police
units — that closely paralleled the list of tasks frequently cited by
the Bush administration as the pillars of the current strategy.

General Sanchez, now a Pentagon consultant who trains active-duty
generals, said the administration’s biggest failure had been its lack
of a detailed strategy for achieving those steps and “synchronizing”
the military and civilian contributions.

“The administration, Congress and the entire inter-agency, especially
the State Department, must shoulder responsibility for the catastrophic
failure, and the American people must hold them accountable,” he said.

His talk on Friday at the annual convention of the Military Reporters
and Editors Association was not the first time that General Sanchez has
been critical of the administration.

He said in an interview in June with Agence France-Presse that the best
the United States could achieve in Iraq would be stalemate. And he drew
a standing ovation at a gathering of veterans last month when he argued
that the country’s problems in Iraq were the result of a “crisis in
national political leadership.”

Though General Sanchez remained on active duty after leaving Iraq in
2004, he never received a fourth star, in part because, though he was
popular with Mr. Rumsfeld, the Bush administration feared that his
nomination hearings in the Senate would turn into a bitter partisan
fight and a public replay of the details of the Abu Ghraib scandal.

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

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